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I.

INTRODUCTION

Mediators face daunting challenges, even in the simplest of
cases. Parties and their counsel ask mediators to transform conflict
into concurrence and disputes and hostility into agreements and
harmony. To succeed, a mediator must quickly master the material
facts, develop rapport and trust with the parties and counsel,
present and articulate both sides of disputed issues, and ascertain
mutually agreeable solutions to all disputed issues. Once the
mediator completes those tasks and helps the parties negotiate an
† Partner at Coleman Hull & van Vliet, PLLP, served as Chair of the
Minnesota State Bar Association’s Construction Section, served on the Governing
Committee of the American Bar Association Forum on the Construction Industry,
and provides dispute resolution services, with extensive experience as an arbitrator
and mediator of construction and commercial disputes.
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agreement, he must then be able to document that agreement in a
written, coherent, and enforceable agreement.
Mediation and the mediator’s role are inherently difficult.
The difficulty, however, increases exponentially in cases with
multiple parties, extensive lists of disputed factual issues, complex
legal and contractual disputes, large damages claims, insurance
disputes, and heightened emotions. The typical construction case
presents most of these factors and accounts for why construction
cases can be difficult, challenging, time consuming, and frustrating
for all parties involved in the process.
However, the existence of these factors also explains why
1
almost all construction cases are mediated. Simply stated, the
same complexities of construction cases that make mediation
challenging are the same complexities that make construction cases
2
so difficult to try or arbitrate and predict the ultimate outcome.
Despite their difficulty, construction cases are most frequently
3
Factors that enhance the
mediated to successful conclusion.
probability of success are usually within the control of the
4
mediator.
Therefore, when faced with large and complex
construction cases, the mediator should consider not only basic
mediation tactics, but also alternative approaches.
One tool a mediator should consider to facilitate the
mediation process is the use of the blind settlement process. In
blind negotiations, the mediator negotiates with confidential
numbers from all the parties and discloses only the gap between
the claimants’ demand and the defending parties’ collective offers.
Individual contributions or the final settlement amount remain
confidential throughout the mediation process.
This article will explore the factors that make construction
5
cases and mediation of construction cases difficult.
After
identifying the hurdles to successful construction mediation, the
article will then focus on the benefits of the use of a blind
1. Richard P. Flake & Susan G. Perin, Mediating Construction Disputes: What
Works and What Doesn’t, DISP. RESOL. J., May-July 2003, at 24–26.
2. Id. at 34. Flake and Perin note that construction cases are “notoriously
complex.” Id. at 26.
3. John P. Madden, Recipe for Success in Construction Mediation, DISP. RESOL. J.,
May-July 2001, at 16, 18. Madden indicates that more than eighty-five percent of
construction disputes settle successfully. Id.
4. Id. at 21. Two out of the four factors for success that Madden notes are
squarely within the control of the mediator: knowledge of the facts in dispute and
expertise in the subject matter. Id.
5. Infra Part A.
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6

settlement process. The discussion and analysis regarding the use
of a blind settlement process will focus on the context of
construction disputes.
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF CONSTRUCTION CASES
Construction projects produce an abundance of litigation.
The construction project begins as an intangible idea or desire in
the mind of the owner. The owner conveys his intangible idea and
desire for the project to an architect, an engineer, or a designbuilder. The design professional then works with the owner to
quantify and define the owner’s thoughts and to develop tangibly a
final design for construction. The process continues as the project
goes from paper to actual construction. Throughout the process,
the project evolves and changes up to the date of completion.
The disparate interests of all the parties participating in a
construction project increase the potential for disputes or claims.
The owner wants the project done quickly, to the highest level of
7
quality, and at the lowest cost. The design professional works to
prepare a design that meets the owner’s desires and budget
constraints. Further, the design professional seeks to convey all
required information, coordinate all disciplines, maintain a budget,
and still allow the contractor to exercise control over the means
and methods of construction. Finally, the contractor desires to
complete the project as specified and to maximize profit on the
project. To this end, the contractor is interested in minimizing
costs and does so by completing only the work specified without
any extras. However, this often causes the contractor’s vision of the
project to vary significantly from the vision of the owner or the
8
design professional.
The large number of participants is another key factor that
9
increases the potential for claims on construction projects. On any
6. Infra Part E.
7. E.g., Susan Conbere & Asa Foss, More, Better, Faster, Cheaper: Technology
Solutions
for
Advancing
the
Homebuilding
Process,
CAL.
BUILDER,
http://www.cabuilder.com/internal.asp?pid=107 (discussing recent trends in the
construction industry’s strategies for efficiency and cost-effectiveness) (last visited
Nov. 15, 2007).
8. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality
and Reform in a Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463 (discussing the divergent
interests of the various parties to a construction contract).
9. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for
Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 478 (1987) (stating that parties to a prime
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given project, the owner may contract with several different entities
10
in order to create a project. The owner may contract with an
owner’s representative, a construction manager, an architect, an
11
engineer, and a general contractor. Each of these parties may in
turn retain sub-consultants or subcontractors to complete the
12
project. The general contractor in almost all circumstances will
enter into several subcontracts and supply agreements to complete
13
the project. In short, the higher the number of participants in a
project, the greater the likelihood of claims and complexity of legal
14
issues and disputes that arise from the project.
As the potential claims increase, the mediation of construction
disputes becomes more complicated. Many construction disputes
arise from or relate to the claimed existence of design or
15
The list of design or
construction defects on a project.
construction defects can range from fairly small (one to three) to
16
enormous (hundreds to thousands).
The disputes are further
complicated if they involve scheduling, delay, or acceleration
claims. In those cases, virtually every aspect of the construction
project becomes material and critical in determining cause and
responsibility. If managed improperly, those types of legal issues
can cause a single lawsuit to morph into countless individual “mini
17
lawsuits.”
Further complicating the mediation of construction disputes
are the issues of risk shifting, risk avoidance, or collections. In
many construction cases, the existence and enforceability of
insurance coverage, surety protection, indemnity agreements, or
other risk management devices can significantly complicate
18
resolution of construction disputes.
General liability insurers
contract for construction seldom go into battle in isolation).
10. Id. at 478–79.
11. Id. See also cases cited id. at 478 n.40.
12. Id. See also cases cited id. at 479 n.42.
13. Id. at 479.
14. Id. at 479–80. See also 2 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §
51:1 (3d ed. 2006).
15. See Richard H. Glucksman & Glenn T. Barger, Managing Construction Defect
Cases, CONSTRUCTION LAW., July 1996, at 7, 7–8 (discussing the typical legal
progression when an owner files suit based on an alleged defect).
16. Cf. Debra Porgrund Stark & Andrew Cook, Pay it Forward: A Proactive
Model to Resolving Construction Defects and Market Failure, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 6–8
(2003) (discussing the nature and extent of common construction defects).
17. See Stipanowich, supra note 9, at 479 nn.44–45 (citing numerous cases
involving multiple derivative lawsuits).
18. Cf. Robert L. Meyers, III & Debra A. Perelman, Risk Allocation Through
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frequently raise coverage issues that dramatically affect the ability
19
of case resolution. Surety companies that may be involved in a
mediation or construction loss will not only work hard to avoid
unnecessary payments, but will also preserve and pursue indemnity
or recovery of any payments made from their principals or
20
indemnitors.
Further, indemnity agreements contained in
subcontracts can dramatically change a party’s liability exposure
21
and insurance coverage. Anti-indemnification statutes and each
22
state’s interpretation of indemnity clauses also come into play.
Finally, given the volatile nature of the construction industry,
collection of claims is often a fundamental concern either because
the contractor is insolvent or out of business, or because of
23
insurance coverage questions.
Finally, a mediator and the parties must understand that on
any given construction lawsuit, multiple mediations occur at any
given time. Although an owner may have a single claim against the
general contractor or the design professional, the general
contractor and design professional are negotiating not only with
the owner but also with subcontractors, sub-consultants, insurers or
sureties, and one another. Each entity may also pursue affirmative
claims against the project owner and each other.

Indemnity Obligations in Construction Contracts, 40 S.C. L. REV. 989 (1989) (discussing
the legal complexities of indemnification in construction contracts).
19. CHRIS E. RYMAN, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES: HOW AND WHEN TO SETTLE TO
SAVE THE MOST MONEY FOR YOUR CLIENT 5–6 (presented to the DRI Construction
Law
Seminar,
Sept.
9–10,
2004,
Scottsdale,
AZ),
available
at
http://www.coatsrose.com/upload/Broadcast86.pdf.
20. See John W. Hinchey, Surety’s Performance Over Protest of Principal:
Considerations and Risks, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 133, 137–38 (1986).
21. See, e.g., Holmes v. Watson-Forsberg Co., 488 N.W.2d 473, 474–75 (Minn.
1992) (holding that a provision of a standard subcontract agreement, which
required subcontractor to purchase liability insurance for all damages and injury
to all persons and property resulting from or in any manner connected with
execution of work provided for in subcontract, was enforceable promise to provide
specific insurance coverage for benefit of others, rather than an unenforceable
indemnification agreement).
22. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 337.01–.05 (2006) (reflecting Minnesota’s antiindemnification statutes, which, despite being labeled “anti-indemnification”
statutes, set out the process that must be followed to generate enforceable broad
form indemnity agreements); Holmes, 488 N.W.2d at 474–75.
23. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Construction Claims in Bankruptcy: Making the Best of
a Bad Situation, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 343 (1995) (describing the difficulties that
construction litigants face in trying to recover money from insolvent parties).
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After subcontractors or sub-consultants are added to the mix,
they in turn negotiate with the owner, the general contractor, the
architect, suppliers, insurers or sureties, and each other.
Given these complexities, the mediator must evaluate and
consider every aspect of the mediation process, including the
structure of negotiations, to maximize chances of successfully
resolving construction disputes. In this regard, one option for the
mediator to consider is the use of blind settlement negotiations.
III. MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
A. In General
24

Confidentiality is a basic principal of the mediation process.
A confidential mediation process encourages participants to speak
openly regarding their interests, concerns, and desires without fear
that their disclosures will be used against them in court if the case
25
Most mediators confirm the existence and
does not resolve.
importance of the confidential nature of mediation early in the
26
process. Many courts have expressed the belief that mediation
27
confidentiality encourages settlements. Parties are more likely to
be open and honest with each other as well as the mediator.
Accordingly, the likelihood of settlement increases because the
parties know that the communications exchanged in mediation,
and the ultimate agreement reached through mediation, would be
28
excluded from evidence in any later proceedings.
The Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) drafted by the National
29
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws reflects the
24. Diane K. Vescovo et al., Essay—Ethical Dilemmas in Mediation, 31 U. MEM. L.
REV. 59, 80 (2000).
25. CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION & SETTLEMENT §
16.08(8)(a) (5th ed. 2005).
26. See id.
27. Sarah Williams, Confidentiality in Mediation: Is it Encouraging Good Mediation
or Bad Conduct?, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 209, 215 (2005).
28. See In re Lake Utopia Paper, Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d
928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979) (remarking that a lack of confidentiality would constrain
parties to conduct themselves in a “cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner
more suitable to poker players in a high-stakes game than to adversaries
attempting to arrive at a just resolution of a civil dispute”). See also David A. Ruiz,
Asserting a Comprehensive Approach for Defining Mediation Communication, 15 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 851, 856 (2000); SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY,
PRACTICE § 9 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997).
29. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
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importance and broad expectation of confidentiality in mediation
30
The UMA addresses confidentiality in several
proceedings.
respects.
First, the UMA creates a privilege for mediation
communications unless it is waived or precluded in other sections
31
The UMA buttresses this position with a
of the Act.
32
confidentiality section. Section 8 of the UMA provides, “[u]nless
subject to the [insert statutory references to open meetings act and
open records act], mediation communications are confidential to
the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of
33
The UMA provision restates commonly accepted
this State.”
practices
regarding
the
confidentiality
of
mediation
communications outside of the mediation process. Essentially,
confidentiality becomes a matter of contract unless otherwise
34
provided for in part by law or statute.
Different jurisdictions vary significantly with regard to the
extent to which confidentiality of mediation communications or
35
Most jurisdictions protect
mediation results is protected.
communications made in mediation from discovery at least to some
36
extent.
These laws addressing confidentiality of mediation
communications have been categorized into three separate areas:
1) blanket confidentiality, whereby no disclosure of any
mediation communications may be made (absolute
confidentiality); 2) nearly absolute confidentiality, subject
to enumerated exceptions, which vary by state statute, or
disclosure only upon consent by all parties, including the
mediator (enumerated confidentiality); or 3) qualified
confidentiality, providing mediation confidentiality but
expressly recognizing judicial discretion to order
disclosure in individual cases where needed to prevent a
37
manifest injustice or to enforce court orders.
(NCCUSL) is a non-partisan organization that drafts model legislation to bring
clarity, stability, and uniformity to state laws. See http://www.nccusl.org. See also
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT FINAL DRAFT (2001), available at http://www.mediate.com/
articles/umafinalstyled.cfm.
30. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm.
31. Id. § 4(a).
32. Id. § 8.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 8 cmt. b.
35. Williams, supra note 27, at 216.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Maureen A. Westin, Confidentiality’s Constitutionality: The
Incursion on Judicial Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8
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Laws passed in Ohio and California provide a good example of
38
the first category, “Absolute Confidentiality.” The Ohio statute
“renders all mediation communications confidential whether the
mediation is court-annexed or arranged by the parties
39
The California statute also provides for absolute
themselves.”
40
confidentiality of mediation communications.
Second, the UMA creates a category of protection called
“Nearly Absolute Confidentiality,” which several states have
41
adopted.
Although the UMA allows some flexibility, it also
42
provides strong protection for mediation communications. This
UMA protection safeguards confidentiality by creating a privilege
to avoid the compelled disclosure of communications in
43
subsequent litigation.
It prevents mediators from making
disclosures to judges or from reporting on the status of any
44
mediation. The UMA exceptions to confidentiality are generally
limited to threats of bodily injury, plans to commit a crime,
evidence of abuse or neglect, evidence of professional misconduct
or malpractice by the mediator, or misconduct or malpractice
45
involving a party, non-party participant or party representative.
The third and the final category of protection that the UMA
creates allows for mediation confidentiality but recognizes judicial
46
discretion to order disclosure.
In Wisconsin, for example,
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 49 (2003)).
38. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1127 (2007) (explaining that California law makes a
mediator’s testimony or writing inadmissible, making it confidential); OHIO REV.
CODE § 2710.07 (2007) (establishing that Ohio law provides that “mediation
communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided
by other sections of the Revised Code or rules adopted under any section of the
Revised Code.”).
39. Williams, supra note 27, at 216 (quoting COLE, supra note 28).
40. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (Supp. 2007). “No evidence of anything said
or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a
mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to discovery . . . .”
Id. § 1119(a).
41. See MassUMA Working Group, Modifications of the Uniform Mediation
Act by States That Have Formally Adopted the UMA as of July 2007,
http://www.massuma.net/umachart.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2007). As of July
2007, nine states had adopted some or all of the UMA. Id. These states are the
District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Utah, Vermont,
and Washington. Id.
42. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4 (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 5.
45. See, e.g., id. § 4.
46. See id. § 6(b)(1).
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protects mediation communications in general, but expressly allows
and recognizes judicial discretion to make exceptions to the
47
general rule. Although support for mediation confidentiality is
well established, some individuals advocate the importance of
disclosure of mediation communications or mediation results
48
under certain circumstances.
Despite the UMA, Minnesota passed its own Civil Mediation
49
This statute, however, is silent as to the issue of
Act.
50
confidentiality. The Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the
District Courts, however, specifically addresses the confidentiality
51
Rule 114.08 states that no
issue in the context of mediation.
evidence of any “ADR proceeding or any fact concerning the
proceeding may be admitted in a trial . . . or in any subsequent
proceeding involving any of the issues or parties to the
52
proceeding.” Rule 114.08 notes that “no statements made nor
47. WIS. STAT. § 904.085(4)(e) (2000) (stating that disclosure is allowed “if
necessary to prevent a manifest injustice of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the
importance of protecting the principle of confidentiality in mediation
proceedings generally.”).
48. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to Private Settlements, in WHAT’S FAIRETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 507–18 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds.,
2004).
49. Minnesota Civil Mediation Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 572.31–.40 (2006).
50. See id.
51. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.08 (2007).
52. Id. at 114.08(a). The full text of the rule reads as follows:
(a) Evidence. Without the consent of all parties and an order of
the court, or except as provided in Rule 114.09(e)(4), no
evidence that there has been an ADR proceeding or any fact
concerning the proceeding may be admitted in a trial de novo
or in any subsequent proceeding involving any of the issues or
parties to the proceeding.
(b) Inadmissibility. Subject to Minn. Stat. § 595.02 and except as
provided in paragraphs (a) and (d), no statements made nor
documents produced in non-binding ADR processes which are
not otherwise discoverable shall be subject to discovery or other
disclosure. Such evidence is inadmissible for any purpose at the
trial, including impeachment.
(c) Adjudicative Evidence. Evidence in consensual special master
proceedings, binding arbitration, or in non-binding arbitration
after the period for a demand for trial expires, may be used in
subsequent proceedings for any purpose for which it is
admissible under the rules of evidence.
(d) Sworn Testimony. Sworn testimony in a summary jury trial may
be used in subsequent proceedings for any purpose for which it
is admissible under the rules of evidence.
(e) Records of Neutral. Notes, records, and recollections of the
neutral are confidential, which means that they shall not be
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documents produced in non-binding ADR processes which are not
otherwise discoverable shall be subject to discovery or other
53
disclosure.” Further, Rule 114.08 confirms that “[s]uch evidence
is inadmissible for any purpose at the trial, including
54
impeachment.”
The appendix to Rule 114 reaffirms the concept of
confidentiality. Rule IV, “Confidentiality,” states that “[t]he neutral
shall maintain confidentiality to the extent provided by Rule 114.08
and 114.10 and any additional agreements made with or between
55
the parties.” Advisory comments on Rule 114 confirm that “[a]
neutral should discuss issues of confidentiality with the parties
before beginning an ADR process[,] including any limitations on
56
the scope [or extent] of confidentiality . . . .” Minnesota has not
yet adopted the UMA, but the UMA is slated for consideration
57
during the 2007–08 legislative sessions.
B. Private Caucuses
The current law in Minnesota and the rest of the United States
reflects a strong preference that any negotiations occurring during
mediation, or settlements resulting from mediation, are treated as
confidential. A related question, however, is how the mediator
should address information provided through separate caucus
sessions during the mediation. In other words, does the mediator
have the right or ability to share information provided by one party
disclosed to the parties, the public, or anyone other than the
neutral, unless (1) all parties and the neutral agree to such
disclosure or (2) required by law or other applicable
professional codes. No record shall be made without the
agreement of both parties, except for a memorandum of issues
that are resolved.
53. Id. at 114.08(b).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 114 app. R. IV.
56. Id.
57. MINNESOTA UNIFORM LAWS COMMISSION: AGENCY PROFILE (2006),
http://www.budget.state.mn.us/budget/operating/200809/nov/331188.pdf. In
its report regarding the 2008–2009 biennial budget, the Uniform Laws
Commission addresses “Key Measures.” The Agency Profile states, “[d]uring the
2007–08 Minnesota legislative session, the Minnesota commissioners will likely
bring to the legislature for consideration the following acts: Uniform Arbitration
Act, Uniform Mediation Act, Uniform Correction of Defamation Act, Uniform
Environmental Covenants Act, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, Uniform
Real Property Recording Act, and Uniform Revised Anatomical Gift Act.” Id.
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in a private caucus with another party in a later caucus? The
Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the District Courts provide
that the mediator shall “maintain confidentiality” to the extent
provided by the Rules and by “any additional agreements made
58
with or between the parties.” Because the Minnesota rules and
Minnesota statutes are silent as to the confidentiality or disclosure
of material exchanged during the caucus sessions, the mediator
early in the process must address this issue.
Mediators differ as to their approach of information
exchanged during private caucuses. Some mediators treat the
information as entirely confidential and agree to disclose
59
information only upon explicit authorization.
Others take the
position that all information provided in the caucus is public unless
60
specifically designated as confidential. A hybrid approach is to
characterize all “factual” information disclosed during private
caucuses as public information, but then characterize as
confidential all other information regarding tactics, strategy,
61
negotiation goals, or other related “non-factual” material.
Regardless of the approach taken, the mediator must make clear
how he will treat information provided during the private caucuses.
Failure to do so may result in improper or unintended disclosure of
62
confidential information.
C. Negotiating in the Blind
The vast majority of published material regarding mediation
confidentiality addresses the issue of confidentiality only with
regard to disclosure and admissibility of information outside the
63
mediation process or with regard to the private caucus. In multiparty cases, however, the concept of confidentiality can be carried
one step further and used to shield or limit information regarding
the parties’ negotiated positions. This circumstance is referred to
64
as the “blind” or “double blind” approach to negotiations.
58. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.08 app. R. IV.
59. Vescovo et al., supra note 24, at 81.
60. Id.
61. The author’s practice is to explain this approach to each party at the
commencement of mediation or in the first caucus session.
62. Vescovo et al., supra note 24, at 81.
63. See, e.g., Flake & Perrin, supra note 1; Vescovo et al., supra note 24;
Williams, supra note 27.
64. Robert A. Creo, Emerging from No Man’s Land to Establish a Bargaining
Model, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 191, 206–07 (2001).
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When the mediator and parties elect to negotiate under a
blind or double blind format, they dramatically reduce the extent
of information provided to each party regarding interim settlement
positions. The mediator typically publishes the claimant’s opening
demand to all defending parties. From that point forward, until
either the case settles or the parties reach impasse, the mediator
65
negotiates with confidential numbers from all parties. Under this
approach, the mediator will not disclose a single party’s settlement
offers or demands to any other party up to and through the final
66
settlement or impasse. This process is discussed below in greater
detail.
In response to the opening demand, the mediator will speak to
all defending parties to confirm the claimants’ opening demand
and secure a contribution toward settlement from all defending
parties. The mediator will then add up the contributions of all the
defendants and disclose the total of these contributions to the
claimant as the collective offer. The mediator will not disclose
individual contributions from each defendant. After the plaintiff
considers the opening offer and responds with a new demand, the
mediator will keep the new demand confidential. Instead of
disclosing the new demand, the mediator simply discloses to each
defendant the gap between the claimant’s new demand and the
defendants’ collective offer. Then, the mediator again meets with
each individual defendant to determine if additional contributions
can be secured toward settlement.
As the mediation progresses, the claimant will know the total
amount offered by the defendants but will not know any individual
contribution from a specific defendant. Each defendant will know
the total amount it agreed to contribute toward a settlement and
the gap between the demand and the collective offers. As the gap
is reduced, each defendant can ultimately determine what
contribution will be required on its behalf in order to reach a
settlement point. If a settlement is reached, the claimant will know
the total amount offered and ultimately accepted to settle the case.
The claimant will not know, however, how the amount was raised
or any individual defendant’s contribution toward the settlement.
Additionally, each individual defendant will not know the total
settlement amount, but instead will know only its respective

65.
66.

See id. at 206.
Id.
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contribution toward the settlement amount. Blind negotiation
prohibits any single party from knowing what the other parties
contributed to the final settlement. Further, no party other than
the claimant will know what the claimant accepted as a final
settlement amount.
To illustrate how blind negotiation of multi-party cases works,
consider the example of a typical construction defect claim.
Assume that the claimant developed a large condominium project
and brought suit against six defendants: the design professional,
the general contractor, a product manufacturer, and three
subcontractors. The claimant’s opening demand to settle the claim
is $1 million. That number is communicated to each of the six
defendants. In response, the mediator solicits responses from each
of the defendants. The defendants contribute a total of $300,000
as their opening response to the demand. The individual
67
contributions are as follows:
Design professional
General Contractor
Product manufacturer
Subcontractor 1
Subcontractor 2
Subcontractor 3

$100,000
$100,000
$25,000
$25,000
$25,000
$25,000

Under the blind approach, when the mediator returns to
speak with the claimant, the mediator conveys an offer of $300,000
but does not detail individual contributions. Assume the claimant
rejects the offer but responds with a demand of $750,000. Upon
returning to the defendants, the mediator does not disclose the
total amount offered to the plaintiff. The mediator also does not
disclose the total amount now demanded by the owner. The
mediator simply advises each defendant that the gap in settlement
positions has been reduced to $450,000, and confirms with each
defendant in confidence the amount of money used from that
individual defendant to establish the current gap. The mediator
then discusses with each defendant the possibility of securing
additional settlement authority, or other pertinent issues. By
disclosing the gap, the mediator confirms that the case will settle if
67. Stated contributions are hypothetical only and are not intended to reflect
any allocation or history of payments in past mediations or the author’s opinion as
to appropriate or proportionate contributions on any given case.
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he can secure additional settlement contributions from the
defendants and/or additional settlement concessions from the
claimant totaling $450,000.
To carry this hypothetical one step further, assume that in the
second round of negotiations the defendants increase their
individual contributions as follows:
Design professional
General Contractor
Product manufacturer
Subcontractor 1
Subcontractor 2
Subcontractor 3

$200,000
$150,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000

After completing the second round of negotiations, the
mediator again reports to the claimant. The mediator advises that
he secured increased contributions totaling $550,000. Again,
individual contributions are not disclosed to the claimant. In
response, the claimant either accepts the money or makes another
demand. Assuming the claimant rejects the offer but agrees to
settle for $650,000, the mediator again returns to the defendants
and advises the defendants that the new gap in settlement positions
is $100,000. This process continues until either the case is settled,
because the gap has been filled, or until the parties no longer move
and reach impasse.
Variations of the blind negotiation approach exist. Some
mediators have used a completely blind process among parties
68
where the gap is not disclosed between the parties. Instead, the
mediator may publish an opening position from the claimant and
the opening position from the defendants. The mediator then
approaches each party in a serial and parallel manner to solicit
their successive bids or moves. The mediator only discloses
whether another party is actively moving or that progress is being
69
made toward settlement.
When the parties are almost in
agreement or at agreement, the mediator either discloses the gap
and suggests final numbers to settle or discloses that the case
70
actually settled.

68.
69.
70.

Creo, supra note 64, at 207.
Id.
Id.
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Another blind negotiation approach is referred to as the
“safety deposit box” method. Under this approach, the mediator
asks each party to put his bottom line number into a safety deposit
71
box. The mediator then advises that if the numbers overlap, the
midpoint of the numbers shall be the settlement amount. If any
significant gap exists based upon these blind numbers, then the
parties are told that a gap exists but are not told of the other side’s
72
number or the size of the gap. The parties are then told that they
may keep their number confidential, disclose their number, or
73
agree to mutual disclosure. If the parties are close to agreement,
the mediator identifies a number, which in his opinion would settle
the case. If a large gap exists, the numbers may be disclosed or the
mediator may continue to work and disclose only the extent of the
74
gap.
Another variation of the blind approach is the “double blind”
75
Under this approach, the mediator
mediator’s proposal.
76
proposes last and final numbers to all parties. The mediator then
asks for only a “yes” or “no” response. If all parties answer “yes,”
the case is resolved. If any party answers “no,” the case continues.
A party answering “no” is not entitled to know the response of the
77
parties.
The blind methods of mediation are not appropriate for every
case. The mediator needs to determine whether the facts, law, and
relative settlement positions of the parties indicate that blind
negotiations would be productive. At times, the mediation process
benefits from open disclosure of all settlement positions, in which
case blind negotiations are counterproductive. Other times,
however, full disclosure of early settlement positions would be
counterproductive and reduce chances of successfully resolving the
case. Given the difficulty of settling multiparty construction cases,
the mediator should at least consider the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the blind method of negotiation. In this regard,
the mediator should determine whether the advantages of blind
negotiation outweigh any potential detriments.
71. Peter Contuzzi, Should Parties Tell Mediators Their Bottom Line?, 6 No. 3
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 30, 31–32 (2000).
72. Id. at 32.
73. Id. at 30–32.
74. Id. at 32.
75. Creo, supra note 64, at 206.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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IV. ADVANTAGES TO BLIND NEGOTIATIONS
A.

Advantages to Claimants

Initially, from the claimant’s perspective, the use of blind
negotiations offers certain advantages. First, a claimant may make
concessions to his true bottom line without worry that it will be
published and, in the event of impasse, used as a starting point for
future negotiations. A claimant and his counsel are fully aware of
this risk in open negotiations and are sometimes reluctant to
disclose a true bottom line because they want to “save room” for
future negotiations. Blind negotiations allow a claimant to move to
his lowest number without repercussion in the event of impasse.
Blind negotiation gives a claimant substantial flexibility in the event
that the case does not settle. A claimant can stay with his stated
bottom line, move to a higher number, or continue to make
concessions and move to a lower number. By providing a claimant
with the protection to go to his true bottom line, the blind
negotiation increases opportunities to settle the case during the
mediation.
Second, a claimant will have slightly more information than
the other parties to the mediation. A claimant will know the total
amount offered to settle the case as well as the total demand.
Although the claimant does not know the individual contributions
that comprise the offer, he may have a better feel as to whether the
case can settle and for potential settlement ranges. Moreover, a
claimant can adjust his demand to show progress or to close a gap
as required to keep negotiations moving.
The use of blind negotiations is particularly beneficial to a
claimant in situations where the defendants generally agree on the
total settlement value of the case but disagree on their relative
contributions to reach that amount. Under these circumstances, a
defendant will often agree to pay a set percentage of the reasonable
settlement value of the case. For example, if a defendant
determined a case had a settlement value of $700,000 and that he
was responsible for half of the settlement, the defendant would
have authority of $350,000. If, in open negotiations, the claimant
indicated it would accept $600,000, the danger exists that the
defendant with authority of $350,000 would reduce its contribution
toward settlement from $350,000 to $300,000 to reflect his view of
the proper liability allocation. Under the blind approach, the
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claimant can reduce his demand in order to settle the case without
fear that the defendants will reduce their relative contributions.
B.

Advantages to Defendants

Blind negotiations also offer advantages to defendants. First,
defendants can offer whatever amounts they deem appropriate to
settle the case without fear that their highest offer at mediation will
78
Second,
become the starting point for future negotiations.
defendants need not worry that their contributions in any single
case will become public and, in effect, set a precedent for
negotiations. Often this confidentiality is equally important to the
defendants, their insurers, and their lawyers. Third, defendants
negotiating in the blind do not need to worry that their
contributions towards any given settlement will be viewed as
disproportionate to the contributions of other parties. Because the
ultimate settlement amount and individual contributions remain
confidential throughout the entire process, no party needs to worry
about complaints regarding the proportionality of its contributions.
Instead, the focus remains on each individual defendant and
whether he believed his payment was fair in exchange for a release
of claims from all other parties.
C.

Advantages to Mediator

Multiparty mediations of any sort can be difficult based solely
on the number, extent, and complexity of disputed issues and
parties. The degree of difficulty increases when the negotiating
styles of the participants or personalities create additional friction
or hurdles to settlement.
One well-known author analyzed
negotiating styles and categorized styles broadly as either
79
Common traits employed to
“cooperative” or “competitive.”
80
distinguish between these two diverse styles are as follows:

78. A related benefit also exists. Where both the defendants and plaintiffs
have the freedom to move to settlement positions without fear that the numbers
or their positions will become public, defendants will benefit from this added
flexibility.
79. CRAVER, supra note 25, § 2.02.
80. Id. § 2.02(1). See also ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES,
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 9 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
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Cooperative/ProblemSolving
Move Psychologically
Toward Opponents
Try to Maximize Joint
Return
Seek Reasonable Results
Courteous and Sincere
Begin with Realistic
Opening Positions
Rely on Objective Standards

Rarely Use Threats
Maximize Information
Disclosure
Open and Trusting
Work to Satisfy Underlying
Interests of Opponents
Willing to Make Unilateral
Concessions
Reason with Opponents

[Vol. 34:1

Competitive/Adversarial
Move Psychologically Against
Opponents
Try to Maximize Own Return
Seek Extreme Results
Adversarial and Disingenuous
Begin with Unrealistic
Opening Positions
Focus on Own Positions
Rather Than Neutral
Standards
Frequently Use Threats
Minimize Information
Disclosure
Closed and Untrusting
Work to Satisfy Underlying
Interests of Own Client
Attempt to Make Minimal
Concessions
Manipulate Opponents

Authors also have noted the distinction between principled
and positional bargaining, hard and soft bargaining, and win-lose
81
and win-win negotiations.
By negotiating in the blind, the
mediator has the opportunity to defuse some of the hard
bargaining tactics typically used by “competitive/adversarial”
negotiators. Such negotiators’ attempts to manipulate opponents,
use threats, commence unrealistic opening positions, or seek
extreme results can all be mitigated, at least to some degree,
through the use of blind negotiations. For example, in the
hypothetical case discussed earlier of the six defendants, if one
defendant opens up with an unrealistically low number in open
negotiations or indicates he would not contribute toward
settlement, this often chills or adversely affects the negotiation
81. Id. at 56–57 (discussing the importance of creating options for “mutual
gain”); RONALD M. SHAPIRO & MARK J. JENKOWSKI, THE POWER OF NICE: HOW TO
NEGOTIATE SO EVERYONE WINS—ESPECIALLY YOU 27-61 (1998) (discussing the
dangers of “I win – you lose” negotiations and emphasizing the benefits of “winwin” negotiations).
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process. This defendant’s extreme position may lead the other
defendants to take extreme positions in response. By negotiating
in the blind, one party’s extreme position will not necessarily infect
the entire process.
The second advantage to mediators is the ability to buy time to
respond to unreasonable or extreme bargaining positions. If one
defendant starts unreasonably low but another defendant is willing
to put in money early, the mediator can allow one party to
essentially “over-contribute” early in the process to further the
negotiation process. As the parties get closer to resolution, a party
that is too low may adjust its position and ultimately make a
significant contribution while the other party that “overcontributed” can reduce its proportionate share later in the
process. The use of confidential or blind negotiations allows the
mediator to use early progress from certain defendants to increase
chances that by the end of the mediation, he will be able to secure
reasonable contributions from all parties.
Blind negotiations also help mediators manage perceptions of
the parties.
Mediators must acknowledge that individuals
participating in bargaining are necessarily competitive. Even in the
classic “win-win” negotiation setting, each party would like his win
82
to be slightly better than the others. Similarly, when participants
use cooperative techniques to expand the overall benefits of
settlement to all parties, some parties will simultaneously continue
to employ competitive tactics that enable them to claim victory at
83
Where the parties do not know the final
the mediation.
settlement number and do not know what the other parties paid,
but do know that they accomplished a settlement within their
stated goals, is it much easier to declare or claim victory in the
negotiations. Cases are less difficult to settle when all parties
perceive they were victorious. The blind negotiation approach
increases this chance.
Blind settlement negotiations also help limit the tactic referred
to as “nibbling.” Nibbling is the practice of negotiators who seek to
negotiate to an apparent resolution based on a recommendation or
apparent authority, and then later attempt to reopen negotiations
84
when the agreement is documented.
Under this technique,
negotiators “agree” to final settlements with apparent client
82.
83.
84.

SHAPIRO & JENKOWSKI, supra note 81, at 45–46.
CRAVER, supra note 25, § 9.02.
Id. § 10.02(10)(a).
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authority. All parties are then pleased with the agreement and
develop a mindset that the case is settled. Later, one party will
indicate that he is unable to secure final authority and then seeks
85
to negotiate additional concessions.
Although the tactic seems
86
obvious, it is quite frequently used and successfully employed.
Where the positions of all parties are confidential, the mediator
can control each party and declare a settlement exists only when it
in fact has final authority. Further, because the final settlement
terms are confidential, a party only knows its contribution and is
unable to determine where it can most effectively “nibble” at the
positions of other parties.
The blind negotiation technique also helps the mediator focus
parties on the particular case at issue as opposed to future cases. In
other words, defendants often times fight the request to contribute
towards a settlement or to increase an offer in fear that the move
will affect negotiations in future cases. The same is true for
claimants and claimants’ lawyers that express a reluctance to lower
a demand. The parties and their counsel may fear that concessions
would be seen as a weakness that could affect other cases.
However, when the ultimate settlement and each party’s
contribution to the settlement remain confidential, no
precedential value attaches to the result. This greatly increases the
chances that the parties will negotiate on the specific case at issue
and not on unknown or unrelated cases that may occur in the
future.
Negotiating in the blind also helps avoid the parties present
surprises with regard to the positions of co-defendants or coclaimants. These surprises are often in the form of demands or
87
offers that frequently ruin mediation negotiations. For example,
in open negotiation parties may say that they will move only
conditioned upon proportionate moves from other parties. Parties,
88
Another
however, rarely agree on the same proportionality.
situation occurs when a defendant indicates he will not move again
until the claimants have reduced their demand to what that
defendant views as a realistic level. When the negotiations are
85. Id. (citing MARTIN E. LATZ, GAIN THE EDGE: NEGOTIATING TO GET WHAT YOU
WANT 207 (2004)).
86. GARY KARRASS, NEGOTIATE TO CLOSE 109–10 (1985).
87. See Robert A. Creo, How a ‘Blind-Trust Method’ Resolves Multi-Defendant
Cases, 17 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 145 (1999) (discussing methods for
handling defendants who have a great deal of mistrust among themselves).
88. Id.
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blind, defendants do not know if claimants moved to a realistic
level or if other defendants made contributions to a realistic level.
Instead, defendants only know their current contribution and the
gap that needs to be filled prior to settlement. This helps the
mediator keep each party focused only on his contribution and the
relative merits or demerits of continuing settlement.
V. DISADVANTAGES TO BLIND NEGOTIATIONS
Disadvantages to blind negotiations exist. First, a certain
reluctance to proceed in the blind by all parties is present,
particularly to those unfamiliar with the process. Lawyers and
89
parties want more information as opposed to less. Lawyers and
their clients are constantly looking for a “leakage” of information
from the mediator as to the positions taken by other parties or the
facts provided by another party that will give them the upper hand
in settlement negotiations.
Second, the blind system of negotiation affects the pace of
negotiations. Typically, where parties know that their contributions
are confidential, they may tend to start at a slightly lower level.
Thus, negotiations begin slowly. The opening gaps are typically
large and intimidating. Many times the opening gaps are larger
than what might be the ultimate settlement value of the case.
However, if the mediator is committed to proceeding under a blind
approach, it is essential to keep the parties negotiating even when
opening gaps are viewed as enormous. In this regard, the mediator
should understand that the negotiation dynamics vary under the
blind approach as compared to the open approach. Typically, the
numbers will move up in roughly equal steps as the parties
complete rounds of negotiation until parties near the end of their
settlement authority or range. The mediator must understand this
phenomenon and explain it to all parties, particularly claimants, in
order to keep them engaged early in the process when the gap
seems insurmountable.
Third, the mediator will be constantly subjected to questions
regarding the relative positions of the parties. If the process is truly
blind, the mediator must guard each party’s position zealously.
Besides disclosing the claimant’s opening demand or the fact that a
party is contributing toward the settlement, the mediator should
not provide information as to the amount of any particular party’s
89.

Id.
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contributions. The leaking or disclosure of any single number
could be enough to allow one party to deduce or identify the
remaining numbers and thereby frustrate the process. Further, if
any party senses that the mediator did leak or will leak numbers,
the chances of success will be reduced dramatically.
VI. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BLIND NEGOTIATIONS
In blind negotiation, the mediator has important ethical
responsibilities to the parties. Initially, the mediator must remain
impartial throughout the mediation. In Minnesota, the General
Rules of Practice for the District Courts confirm the obligation that
90
The UMA requires that
the mediator must remain impartial.
before accepting a mediation assignment, the mediator shall
reasonably investigate all circumstances to determine whether any
known facts exist that a reasonable individual would consider likely
91
to affect the impartiality of the mediator. The UMA provides that
the mediator be impartial, unless the parties agree otherwise, after
92
disclosure of required facts.
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators also confirm
93
the obligation of impartiality.
Standard II provides that a
mediator “shall conduct the mediation in an impartial manner and
94
It also
avoid conduct that gives the appearance of partiality.”
requires that the mediator actually decline the mediation
assignment if he cannot conduct the mediation in an impartial
95
manner. Impartiality for these purposes is defined as “freedom
96
from favoritism, bias or prejudice.”
In blind negotiations, a mediator often offers estimates to each
party of the settlement position required from that individual party
in order to resolve the case. In this regard, the mediator must not
share information provided by a party in private caucuses regarding
ultimate authority with any other party unless specifically

90. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114 app. R. I.
91. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm.
92. Id.
93. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduct_april2007
.pdf.
94. Id. at Standard II-B.
95. Id. at Standard II-A.
96. Id.
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97

authorized to do so. Circumstances may exist where the mediator
has been informed that a claimant’s bottom line is less than the
total available authority of defendants. Knowing the claimant
would settle for less, the available authority raises the question of
whether the mediator can intervene and advise the defendants not
to offer much. Conversely, the mediator may know that the
defendants will offer more, and this raises the question of whether
the mediator can advise the claimant to increase his demand. The
answer to both of these questions is not based on impartiality and
98
confidentiality concerns. While the mediator may know a party’s
bottom line, he is obligated not to disclose the bottom line unless
he has specific permission. Instead, the mediator is obligated to
99
convey the stated authority as directed by each party.
However, the mediator in this situation must be careful that,
when conveying positions different from a previously disclosed
bottom line, he does not advise other parties that an interim
position is a bottom line. This would be a misrepresentation and
violate the mediator’s standards of conduct as set out in Rule 114,
100
the UMA, and the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators.
Several other ethical issues arise during blind mediations, such
as whether a mediator should give an evaluation of the case, draft
the written settlement agreement, or testify as to whether the
parties actually reached an agreement. Each issue arises in all
mediations, but particularly in those where the blind method of
101
negotiation is used.
A full analysis of these ethical issues,
102
however, is outside the scope of this article.

97.
98.
99.

Id. at Standard V-B.
Vescovo et al., supra note 24, at 82.
Id. See also Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 691, 693 (2001).
100. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114 app. R. IV; UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8; MODEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard V.
101. In blind negotiations, the Mediator needs to be prepared to draft the
written agreement, or at least participate in drafting the written agreement to
assure that provisions are made to maintain the “blind” status of negotiations, and
to incorporate any mediation disclosures required by statute. Minnesota Statutes
section 572.31, subdivision 1, requires incorporation of certain language into any
mediated settlement agreement as a condition to enforceability.
102. Those who are interested, however, see Vescovo et al., supra note 24, at
81–85.
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VII. DOCUMENTING A MEDIATED SETTLEMENT
Negotiating the initial settlement agreement is certainly the
key component to the success of any mediation. Just as critical to
the success of mediation, however, is the preparation of a
thorough, complete, and enforceable mediated settlement
agreement document.
This is particularly true in blind
negotiations, where the mediator must structure the agreement
and the payments in such a way as to maintain the confidentiality of
the settlement amounts and contributions.
103
The agreement must be reduced to writing. Historically, the
mediated settlement agreement was a handwritten document that
identified the key bullet points of the settlement. The mediated
settlement agreement was signed or initialed by all parties and
subject to an agreement to prepare a formal settlement agreement
and release. More recently, in part due to the availability of
technology, mediators prepare more detailed settlement
agreements and releases for the parties’ immediate signature.
Regardless of the final form, the agreement should be completed
before the parties leave the mediation. The documents are final
binding expressions of the parties’ settlement and typically address
the following:
1. Consideration paid or accepted for the settlement;
2. Timing for payment;
3. Identity of payee and payer;
4. Formal scope of any negotiated release of claims and
confirmation of whether the releases are mutual or
one-way;
5. Issues of confidentiality, non-disparagement, or other
peripheral terms of the agreement;
6. Inclusion of mediation disclosures, such as stating the
mediator does not represent either party, the
settlement agreement and release is binding and
affects legal rights, and the parties have been
103.

MINN. STAT. § 572.33 subdiv. 4 (2006).
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represented by counsel and have authority to sign the
agreement; and
7. Inclusion of enforcement provisions. Specifically, most
mediated settlement agreements will include provisions
indicating that all claims are released as set forth in the
agreement but that all parties reserve claims relating to
enforcement of the settlement agreement. Typically,
there will be an attorneys’ fees clause where the
prevailing party is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees in
the event it is necessary to enforce provisions of the
104
settlement agreement.
The mediator, when preparing the mediated settlement
agreement and release, should consider any unique state or
jurisdictional requirements necessary to assure enforceability of the
mediated settlement agreement. In Minnesota, courts require
105
In Haghgihi v. Russian-American
specific mediation disclosures.
Broadcasting Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court set aside the
mediated settlement agreement because the agreement did not
106
The court noted that Minnesota
include required disclosures.
Statutes section 572.31, subdivision 1, provides that a mediated
settlement agreement is not binding unless it contains statutory
107
provisions.
104. In construction cases, typically other issues exist that should be addressed
in a Mediated Settlement Agreement. Some issues that typically arise and that
should be included by the mediator, regardless of whether the settlement
negotiations are conducted openly or in the blind, are as follows:
a. Handling of the retainage;
b. Whether the release includes future, but as yet, undiscovered claims;
c. Whether lien releases/satisfactions need to be prepared and exchanged;
d. Whether closeout documentation is required between the parties;
e. Addressing remaining work or punch list items;
f. Whether any subrogation or indemnity rights exist; and
g. Indemnity or protection in the event of future claims for contribution or
indemnity, warranties for any in-kind work, or other alternative
consideration.
Cf. Rodney A. Max, Multiparty Mediation, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 269, 288–89
(1999) (identifying some items to be included in the mediated settlement
agreement). The balance are items that should be considered based on the
author’s experience.
105. See Haghgihi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 577 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. 1998).
106. Id. at 929-30.
107. Id. at 928. The 1996 statute stated:
A mediated settlement agreement is not binding unless it contains a
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In addition to these key components, in a blind negotiation,
the agreement should include confidential attachments for each
individual party confirming the amount each defendant
contributed to settle the case or, in the case of claimants, the
amount each agreed to accept in return for settlement of the case.
The confidential attachment for each party is attached to the copy
of the general mediated settlement agreement provided to that
108
respective party. Usually each party initials the attachments, and
109
the mediator retains the originals. The mediator should develop
some typical language to implement the confidential mediated
settlement agreement without disclosing the settlement amounts.
The mediator can funnel the settlement contributions through his
110
trust account to protect the blind status of the negotiations. The

provision stating that it is binding and a provision stating substantially
that the parties were advised in writing that (a) the mediator has no duty
to protect their interests or provide them with information about their
legal rights; (b) signing a mediated settlement agreement may adversely
affect their legal rights; and (c) they should consult an attorney before
signing a mediated settlement agreement if they are uncertain of their
rights.
MINN. STAT. § 572.35 subdiv. 1 (1996).
108. Language used by the author to implement the confidential settlement
requires the use of attachments and reference to the attachments in the mediated
settlement agreement. A typical agreement could provide as follows:
The Claimants agree to accept in full settlement of their claims and as
consideration for the other terms and conditions of this Mediated
Settlement Agreement the terms set out on the attached Confidential
Exhibit A which shall be provided only to Claimants and their counsel
and shall be held by the Mediator in accordance with the terms of this
Mediated Settlement Agreement.
Each of the Defending Parties agrees to pay or extend the consideration
described in their respective Confidential Exhibits described below in
exchange for a full release of the claims as set out in this Mediated
Settlement Agreement, which Confidential Exhibits shall be separately
provided to each Defending Party and its counsel and shall be held by
the Mediator in accordance with the terms of this Mediated Settlement
Agreement.
109. The mediator needs to retain either the originals or a copy of the
confidential attachments to monitor payments, and if necessary, take steps to
confirm the parties have implemented terms of the confidential settlement
agreement.
110. When mediating using blind negotiations, the settlement agreement must
be structured to protect the confidential nature of each party’s contribution or the
ultimate settlement amount. This is done through the use of confidential
attachments. The following language has been used with blind negotiations to
implement the settlement and establish a payment structure that maintains
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confidentiality. The structure calls for all payments to be made to the mediator’s
trust account and then distributed by the mediator:
CONSIDERATION.
A. Consideration for the Claimants. The Claimants agree to accept in full
settlement of their claims and as consideration for the other terms and
conditions of this Mediated Settlement Agreement the terms set out on
the attached Exhibit A which shall be executed by the Claimants and
shall be held by the Mediator in accordance with the terms of
paragraph C below.
B. Consideration Extended by Defending Parties. Each of the Defending
Parties agrees to pay or extend the consideration described in their
respective exhibits described below in exchange for a full release of the
claims asserted or that could have been asserted against and between
the Claimants and Defending Parties in the above referenced matter as
set forth above and in other terms and conditions of this Mediated
Settlement Agreement, which exhibits shall be separately executed by
each respective Defending Party and shall be held by the Mediator in
accordance with the terms of paragraph C below.
•
Exhibit B – Consideration for Defendant 1
•
Exhibit C – Consideration for Defendant 2
•
Exhibit D – Consideration for Defendant 3
•
Exhibit E – Consideration for Defendant 4
•
Exhibit F – Consideration for Defendant 5
•
Exhibit G – Consideration for Defendant 6
All payments made shall be made within thirty days from the date of
this Mediated Settlement Agreement, through checks payable to the
Mediator’s trust account. Mediator will disburse checks upon receipt
of signed Mediated Settlement Agreement from Claimants and checks
clearing trust account.
Defending Parties may evidence their
acceptance of these terms by signature of this document, however in
the absence of a signature, Defending Parties shall also be deemed to
have accepted the terms of this Mediated Settlement Agreement by
submitting payment of consideration reflected in this Agreement. All
Parties to this Agreement have advised Mediator that they accept the
terms of this Agreement and signatures will follow.
C. Confidentiality of Consideration. All parties hereto acknowledge the
sufficiency of the consideration for this Mediated Settlement
Agreement, but further agree that such consideration shall be kept
confidential in accordance with the following terms:
(1) Exhibits A through G shall be separately executed by the
respective party identified with said Exhibits.
(2) Exhibits A through G shall be held by the Mediator and
shall not be disclosed to any of the other parties unless and
until the Mediator determines, in his sole discretion, that it
is necessary to disclose the contents of one or more of said
exhibits in order to effectuate and enforce the terms of this
Mediated Settlement Agreement.
(3) All Parties to this Mediated Settlement Agreement hereby
agree that Mediator may release all checks provided within
thirty days in one lump sum. In the event checks are not
provided within thirty days as required by this Mediated
Settlement Agreement, then Mediator is hereby authorized
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mediator should be aware that he could be characterized as an
111
escrow agent with regard to the funds and must be careful only to
release funds consistent with the terms agreed to by the parties.
Although the time required to prepare a formal release can be
extensive, the time is well spent because it helps avoid the
negotiation of every term and interpretation of the handwritten
settlement agreement. Instances exist, however, when the use of a
handwritten, bullet point, broad-form mediated settlement
agreement is appropriate. In those instances, the mediator should
consider inserting a provision that confirms that the parties
reached a binding and enforceable settlement agreement and that
in the event of any final dispute over language, the mediator shall
be the final arbitrator of the language. In most situations, if the
mediator has the ability to resolve any disputes regarding the final
settlement language, the parties tend to be reasonable and the final
agreement tends to be created without further mediator
involvement. Where, however, the parties are unable to agree
upon final language, the mediator can resolve the dispute subject
to his interpretation of the parties’ intentions. By agreeing that the
mediator can resolve disputes regarding final release language, the
parties ensure a settlement and substantially reduce the potential
of the settlement falling apart.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unlike the construction project, construction mediation lacks
plans and specifications. The cliché that “mediation is more an art
112
than a science” may be accurate.
Every mediation takes its own
course, and each mediator has his own style, which reflects his
to advise Plaintiff of the identity of any parties that have not
made payments, and Plaintiff may contact non-paying
parties directly to secure payment.
111. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “escrow” as “[t]he general arrangement
under which a legal document or property is delivered to a third person until the
occurrence of a condition.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 584 (8th ed. 2004).
Arguably, a mediator holding settlement funds for a third party pending receipt of
a signed agreement fits this definition. The author is aware that the Attorney’s
Liability Assurance Society, Inc. (ALAS), a professional liability insurer for
attorneys, has advised at least one firm that a mediator holding settlement funds
could face liability as an escrow agent. No cases have been located, however, to
support or refute this position.
112. Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the
Mediative Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885,
942 (1997). See also RYMAN, supra note 19, at 8, 9; Max, supra note 104, at 289.
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113

personality.
The mediator must take his individual style and use
all the tools available to navigate parties toward the ultimate goal: a
negotiated resolution. Although construction mediations are
complex, time consuming, and flush with legal, factual, and
personal disputes, settlement potential exists. Settlement provides
closure, reestablishes and preserves relationships, and allows the
114
parties to control their destiny. The use of blind negotiation can
dramatically increase a mediator’s ability to successfully resolve
construction disputes and secure the benefits of a mediated
resolution.

113. NADJA M. SPEGEL ET AL., NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND TECHNIQUE 20–21
(Butterworths 1998).
114. FISHER & URY, supra note 80, at 23 (addressing negotiation strategies,
styles, and results).
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